

Emergency Aid (Gurmad) for the Revival of the Somali State

A proposal for a transition to a
democratic, non-clan-based
system of government

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Personal introduction

I was born of a nomadic family at the beginning of the Second World War in Haud and Reserved Area, or Western Somalia, now the Fifth Region of Ethiopia. My parents died of malaria when I was two years old and I was brought up by my maternal uncle. I was fortunate as my uncle was working for the British Somaliland administration, and he got me into the well-known Sheikh School in Northern Somalia.

In 1940 the Italian fascist troops took over all the Somali territories. Then in 1941 the British took over all the Somali territories, Ethiopia and Eritrea from the Italians. As a boy, after the war, I still remember listening to the Somali soldiers who had fought in the British, Italian and French armies. Their stories of other peoples and cultures opened our eyes to the wider world.

In 1946 the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, seeing that all the Somalis were one homogeneous people, proposed in the 'Bevin Plan' to unite all of them in one country. Unfortunately the UN rejected this proposal, suspecting the British of imperial ambitions. In 1955, when I was in primary school, Haud and Reserved Area, or Western Somalia, was officially transferred to the Ethiopian Empire (honouring a promise made by the British to the Emperor Menelik in 1897 in return for his help in defeating the Mahdi in Sudan). That ignited Somali nationalism and there were so many meetings and demonstrations that the British Foreign Secretary visited Hargeisa, the capital of British Somaliland. A delegation of Somaliland elders was organised, paid for by public subscription to which everyone donated. The delegation included the famous traditional leaders, Suldan Bihi Foley, Suldan Abdullahi Suldan Deria, Suldan Abdulrahman Suldan Deria, Michael Mariano, Dubbe Ali Yareh, and the man who was permanently struggling at the UN in New York for independence and who became the first Prime Minister of Somalia, Abdullahi Issa. They went first to New York, and then to London, where the British Government said it could do nothing about the transfer of Haud and Reserved Area to Ethiopia, but promised that the North would get its independence at

the same time as the South. (The South had already been promised that it would get its independence in 1960.)

These events shaped the early political consciousness of my generation as we eagerly struggled for Independence and immediate union with Southern Somalia. Since then I have experienced all the political events that Somalis have passed through.

I owe my university education to one of 200 scholarships offered to the Somali Republic by the Soviet Union in 1961. On return to Somalia I entered government service and later became Minister of Fisheries and Marine Transport 1973-84 and was able to contribute to the development of Somalia's fishing industry. I was Chairman of the Bureau for Science and Technology 1984-89 and in 1989 was made Minister of Public Works and Housing which gave me the opportunity to defect and join the Somali National Movement. Since then I, in common with many Somalis, have been a refugee, generously granted citizenship by the United Kingdom.

In 1993 I attended a gathering in Sweden of senior Somalis organised by Initiatives of Change. Though we were from different clans and political factions, there was a willingness to apologise for the wrongs we had committed and to forgive others' mistakes which led to genuine reconciliations among us. Since then I have been convinced that we must adopt this spirit if we are to find our way out of the mess we are in. The moral standards of honesty, purity, unselfishness and love, which every Muslim is asked to observe, are essential foundations for a stable society. This is the message that I tried to demonstrate and express as Deputy Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government 2000-2003, as candidate in the Presidential Elections in 2004 and as Chairman of the UK-based Somali Initiative for Dialogue and Democracy (see Appendix 3).

I believe that the countries of the Horn of Africa are passing through a phase of turmoil that other continents have faced in the past, and that we will emerge. Our destiny, after healing the wounds of the past, is of

friendship and cooperation. But at this point a military solution imposed by the neighbouring countries, especially Ethiopia, will do nothing but harm.

I do not seek office or advancement, but I want to give the rest of my life for the reconciliation of my people and the wider Horn of Africa, and I invite all my compatriots to do the same. My gratitude goes to Jim Baynard-Smith and Peter Riddell for their help in compiling this document.

Osman Jama Ali, November 2008 ©

Preface

In less than a year's time, the mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia will expire. There is little hope that the TFG will be able to create a stable environment in Somalia by that time. The proposal in this document offers a way forward for the Somali people that is urgently needed.

This is an opportunity to make a decisive move away from a clan-based system and to lay the foundations of a modern, democratic state where all Somalis are equal before the law and administrative posts are distributed on a basis of merit, not clan.

First of all, it is necessary to review how the clan-based system has come about.

The origins of clan-based politics and the root-causes of statelessness in Somalia

Before the colonial powers came to Africa, and before the appearance of urban centres, there was no central authority in Somalia. Communities were organised simply: every small clan was either nomadic, moving in search of water and pasture for their animals, or were villagers living by subsistence farming. These communities were mainly clan-based, though there would have been many instances of people of different clans living together.

There were no police or prisons; if a crime was committed, the elders of the community required the criminal to pay compensation. Every sub-clan took responsibility for its offenders because the crime of one person was attributed to the whole clan, and revenge could fall on any member of that clan.

It was an oral society and every member of the sub-clan knew the rules of the society by heart, knowing the penalties for each offence. However, when the colonial powers arrived, the traditional rules were replaced by new rules written in Italian or English. At that time less than one per cent of Somalis could read and write, and those who could were in the urban centres. So the colonial powers used clan-belonging as a means to divide and weaken their common stand, as well as a means of tracing people, equivalent to the European postal addresses.

The political parties that struggled for independence condemned the clan system as divisive and promoted Somali nationalism. Yet, when in 1960 they inherited the system after independence, as they had little more than primary education, no experience of state management, and no elite to support them, they themselves resorted to clannism as a means of governing. This caused the disappearance of the nationalist parties and when elections were called four years later, each Member of Parliament started his own clan-based political party. Those who subsequently became ministers then gave privilege and posts to his own clansmen, and nepotism, injustice, corruption and mistrust took root.

When the state was on the point of collapse in 1969, the army took over. It proclaimed that the principal evil it wanted to eradicate was clannism and in that they had the support of the whole population. For nearly six years, an atmosphere of euphoria reigned and Somalia became very popular in Africa. The army distributed resources justly and carried out a lot of development projects very rapidly. The crucial difference between this and previous governments was the return of many of those who, after independence, had been granted scholarships

to universities in USA, Western and Eastern Europe, especially the Soviet Union, and Egypt. In the non-clannish spirit of the time, they were together able to contribute their skills to develop the country.

In common with the preceding civilian governments, the military regime wished to unify the whole people of Somali origin, liberating those who were still under foreign rule. This created tension with the colonial powers and with its neighbours, especially Ethiopia and Kenya. In 1977, war broke out with Ethiopia and the Somalis retook the whole of the Somali region which Britain had ceded to Ethiopia. However, with the help of the Russians, Cubans and Yemenis, Ethiopia expelled the Somali army from all the areas they had occupied and a large number of Ethiopian-Somali refugees flooded into Somalia.

After the defeat, a group of army officers led by Abdullahi Yusuf attempted to overthrow the government. They failed and Abdullahi Yusuf and some of his collaborators fled to Ethiopia, while others were captured, tried and executed. Instead of just targeting the coup leaders, the military regime branded the whole of Abdullahi Yusuf's clan as traitors. Many were imprisoned, others fled to East Africa, the Gulf and Europe, and their assets such as water tanks were destroyed in the rural areas. That had the effect of strengthening Abdullahi Yusuf and, with the support of the Ethiopian government, he set up the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in Ethiopia.

When the military regime criminalised the whole of Abdullahi Yusuf's clan, people from the other clans opposed this injustice, including the elders of the neighbouring clans in Mudug region and some famous nationalist poets. One of them, Mohamed Ibrahim Hadrawi, wrote a very powerful poem condemning it and was imprisoned for that and other poems. From that date onwards, the regime started becoming clannish in nearly all its attitudes and behaviour.

Shortly after, some Northern politicians and officers fled to Ethiopia and organised their own opposition front, the Somali National Movement (SNM). Again the regime committed the same mistake of

branding all Northerners as ‘anti-revolutionary’, and ‘anti-Somali’. This further weakened the regime as mistrust and division grew within it. Starting from 1981, the military regime carried out a lot of injustice and suppression in the North. Under the command of Gen. Mohamed Hashi Gaani, there were summary executions and many intellectuals and businessmen were jailed without trial. Many others left the country to the Gulf states, Europe and America. At the beginning of 1988, the military regime started peace negotiations with the military regime of Ethiopia and severely increased its suppression of the Northerners especially those who were of the same clan as the leaders of the SNM. The same year, the SNM attacked Hargeisa and Burao, and the military regime, under the command of Gen. Mohamed Said Hersi ‘Morgan’, responded with massacres and the indiscriminate bombing of all the Northern cities, destroying Hargeisa and Burao.

Many Somalis of other clans expressed their sympathy to the Northerners and opposed the action. Some elders of the President’s clan even went to the Northern elders to express their sympathy and sorrow. Some officers of the President’s clan disobeyed orders to fight the Northerners and were jailed. Others from other clans left the army and took their troops to join the opposition. One of them was Col. Ahmed Omar Jess.

The Benadiri people, who had no opposition front, clandestinely approached the Northern elders in Mogadishu and showed their sympathy and support for the Northerners. Every time the military regime committed an action against a clan, people of other clans secretly tried to help them.

In 1988, when the massacre was going on in the North, the military regime organised a gathering of all the Somali clans except the Northerners to convince them to fight against the ‘criminals’ who started the war in the North. However, some elders asked why the Northerners had not been invited to the meeting, and the attempt to unite other Somali clans against the Northerners failed. This is a

further example of the Somalis trying to be one people while the regime was trying to divide them for its own benefit.

Yet another opposition movement, the Somali United Congress (USC), was organised from Ethiopia, this time by General Mohamed Farah Aideed and other politicians from the Mogadishu area, and again the regime targeted the whole of his clan as supporters of the USC. The military regime used the same method and massacred the supporters of the USC. In some cases they were not supporters, but only came from the same clan. Similarly Somalis of other clans showed their support.

One night in Mogadishu at the beginning of 1989, 42 Somali intellectuals originally from the North were taken from their houses to the beach near a sand-dune where they were machine-gunned and buried in a mass grave. Miraculously, one of the victims, survived though wounded, and was able to get back to Mogadishu. By morning the news had spread all over Mogadishu and the world. They were killed for no other crime than belonging to that clan. This atrocity was the straw that broke the camel's back as the international community withdrew its support for the regime. The President of Djibouti, Hassan Guled Abtidon, and the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, made a joint declaration in Djibouti condemning that action. The Mogadishu population were appalled at what had taken place and unanimously supported the Northerners. It effectively marked the end of the military regime.

By this time the regime had reached the point where no one could trust any but his own clansmen. The president had become so suspicious of the other clans that he increasingly resorted to buying the support of his own clan by awarding them promotion, education, health facilities, resources, employment, bank-credits etc. By 1988, all the ministers were in contact with their respective clan-based opposition groups and the regime disintegrated. Because the opposition was divided along clan lines, they could not offer a viable alternative government when the military regime collapsed. All the governments since Siad Barre's

regime were clan-based (Ali Mahdi's, Mohamed Farah Aideed's, Hussein Aideed's, Abdul Kassim Salad's, Abdullahi Yusuf's), and all the opposition groups.

They all failed because they were clan-based. The worst aspect of clannism is that once divisions start there is no end to it. When the clan-based opposition movements had defeated the regime, they divided into sub-sub clans and fought each other. The USC divided into sub-clans headed by General Aideed and Ali Mahdi and fought each other; in the North, in 1995-6, the SNM divided into sub-clans headed by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and Abdul Rahman Ahmed Ali and fought each other; and the SSDF divided into sub-clans headed by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Jama Ali Jama and General Adde Musa and fought each other. The death and destruction resulting from these internal clan divisions was as great as or even greater than the war with the military regime.

After independence the Somali people rejected clannism, but the leaders, whether civilian or military, manipulated clan allegiance just like the colonial powers to weaken opposition and remain in power.

All Somalis are now convinced that our main problem is organisations based on clannism, and that they should be abolished. So many of our Somali poets in their poetry condemn the clan-based approach and explain clearly its futility. So the slogan must be: 'Clannism - never again!'. One of the famous Somali poets, Abdullahi Suldan 'Timocadde' who played an important role in the struggle for Independence and after, composed a powerful poem against clannism, in which he wrote, 'Dugsi ma leh qabyaaladi, waxay dumiso mooyaane' ('Clannism offers no shelter, it only destroys').

The present situation in Somalia – a humanitarian disaster

Before the Ethiopian troops arrived in December 2006, there was some degree of security and order, and one and half million people were living in the capital. The present situation is described by all the humanitarian agencies as the worst humanitarian disaster in the world, worse even than Darfur. One million people have had to flee from the Mogadishu area alone. They cannot go to Ethiopia or Kenya so they are trapped. 10,000 people are estimated to have been killed since the Ethiopian troops arrived, and over 30,000 wounded.

Ethiopian and African Union (AU) troops have responded to minor attacks on them by indiscriminately bombarding whole areas of the city. The international agencies have decided that no humanitarian aid can be offered in this situation and have withdrawn to Kenya.

The situation is further exacerbated by a severe drought. People are fleeing across the Red Sea to Yemen where the UN has set up refugee camps, and there are daily reports of people drowning on the way. Similarly others are trying to reach Europe via Sudan and Libya. The desperate situation has given rise to money-making activities like piracy which is receiving international media attention.

It is obvious to everyone that the present government is not capable of fulfilling the three minimum requirements of a government: to assure internal security (protection of life and property), external security (protection from outside aggression) and the preservation of the value of the currency.

Most Somali experts agree with the recent reports of the British and American experts Sally Healy¹ and Ken Menkhaus² and I am grateful they are revealing the real situation.

¹ Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa, Sally Healy, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2008

² Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare, Ken Menkhaus 09.09.08

Background to the Proposal

After these experiences, there is now a consensus among Somalis that the **clan-based approach is not capable of ensuring stability and development** for Somalia and they are **ready to adopt a non-clan-based system of administration**.

Such a system needs to be **built from the bottom up** starting with District and Regional **‘truth and reconciliation’ processes** leading to the formation of **representative administrative institutions at District, Regional and National levels**.

This proposal suggests **how this may be achieved** and that, **under the supervision of the United Nations**, the most suitable **facilitators of such a process are the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council**.

Somalis have long-term commercial, cultural and spiritual connections with the Arab Gulf States, in particular with Saudi Arabia, but also with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, which command the respect of all the Somali factions.

The proposal also recommends that **local and diaspora Somalis together be engaged** at every stage of the process to begin to involve the huge number of skilled Somalis abroad in the reconstruction of the country and **‘reverse the total brain-drain’**.

Proposal to the United Nations

- **that, at the request of the UN, and under its supervision,**
- **following the withdrawal from Somalia of Ethiopian and all other foreign troops,**
- **the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) undertake a one-year process of mediation starting at District level and leading to**
- **the formation of the following representative, non-clan-based institutions:**
 - **District Councils**
 - **Regional Councils elected by the District Councils**
 - **a National Assembly of Elders (consisting of all surviving Members of Parliament of all previous administrations)**
 - **a Transitional National Territorial Assembly consisting of two representatives nominated by each District Council**
 - **a Transitional National Administration headed by a President elected by the Transitional National Territorial Assembly and the National Assembly of Elders together, who nominates a Prime Minister to form a Cabinet of Ministers.**

At the end of the UN-supervised one-year process of mediation, the Transitional National Administration will have a three-year mandate to lay the foundations for free and fair general elections on the basis of a new democratic, non-clan-based Constitution.

The National Assembly of Elders will continue to serve through the transitional period and the term of the first elected parliament, after which it will be permanently dissolved.

(See Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of this process.)

Factors to take into consideration

- **Why federalism is not appropriate for Somalia**

The idea of a Somali federal state came from Ethiopia. However, in Ethiopia, federalism is based on ethnicity (Amhara, Oromo, Somali, Tigre etc). It is not appropriate for Somalia which is the most homogeneous state in the whole of Africa (one ethnicity, one language, one religion). More importantly, most Somalis believe that Ethiopia is proposing federalism for Somalia as a way of dismembering Somalia into five weaker clan-based states (Somaliland, Puntland, Benadirland, Bayland and Jubbaland). Somalia needs democratic, decentralised administrative regions coordinated by a unified national authority.

- **Why the Ethiopian and African Union troops should be withdrawn and not replaced**

While Somalis are divided along clan lines, any foreign intervention, whether political, military or financial, will be viewed as helping one clan against another. Only if there is genuine reconciliation among the Somalis would outside assistance be acceptable. Therefore the Ethiopian and AU troops should be withdrawn and not be replaced by other troops, even UN troops, for the duration of the process outlined above.

There have been long periods in Somalia when there has been no central authority or foreign troops and the situation was far better than it is now. No clan can permanently defeat another clan and there is no deep animosity between them as they share the same culture and language, and are all Sunni Muslims. Their differences are largely due to divide and rule policies by certain leaders and warlords. On the withdrawal of foreign troops, there may be clan battles, but before long, a basic equilibrium between the clans will establish itself. The absence of foreign troops is essential to the success of any process of genuine mediation. The UN, Gulf and Somali facilitators can be

protected by a small force of peace-keepers from the Gulf and Somalis drawn from all parts of Somalia.

- **Dialogue with the North**

In 1960, the new Somali rulers came to power in an atmosphere of emotional patriotism. They were completely unprepared for the management of a state and couldn't handle the just distribution of national resources, employment, promotion etc. The unification of the North and the South was sudden and unprepared. Under the UN mandate under Italy from 1950, the South had ten years to prepare for independence, but the North did not have the same preparation. At the end of the ten-year mandate, the British wanted to postpone the independence of the North, but the Northerners refused and demanded immediate and unconditional union with the South which the British were obliged to grant. The Northerners gained independence on 26 June 1960, and union took place five days later on 1st July, the day the South got its independence.

In the period leading to independence, both the Italians and the British, and a few Somali politicians in both Protectorates, advised against union. But the unity of the five parts of Somalia was enshrined in the constitution of all the political parties and everyone was in favour of the unification of the first two parts of Somali territory to gain independence from the colonial powers.

At the same time, the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, wanted to annex the Somalis and was trying to convince the Somalis and the international community that they were part of Ethiopia. He invited the Ministers of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland to Addis Ababa and asked them to join his empire. This was an early source of the Somali mistrust of Ethiopian intentions.

After independence, there were great difficulties in reconciling the Italian and British systems of administration. In the period before written Somali was established, there was rivalry between the Italian-educated and British-educated elites. Differences in ranking in the

armed forces and civil service caused problems, and Northern officers and civil servants felt they were not given their fair share of positions. However, those concerned were very few, and there was no friction between ordinary Somalis wherever they came from. Nevertheless, since that time Northerners have claimed they were under-represented in successive parliaments.

In 1988 the Northerners suffered heavily under the military regime. The towns of Hargeisa and Burao were flattened in 40 days of bombing and 50,000 people were killed, with many more injured. Those who survived escaped to the Somali region of Ethiopia where they were protected and helped by the Ethiopian government and the international humanitarian organisations. At the time, the two military regimes of Somalia and Ethiopia were deeply hostile to each other and each supported and armed the other's opposition movements.

Some Northerners wrongly believe it was the Southerners who were responsible for the actions of the regime against them. This is untrue because there wasn't any geography-based allegiance among either the Northerners or the Southerners, and there was no hatred between them because of where they lived. The military regime in its last days was using clannism to play-off one clan against another. It should also be acknowledged that Southerners, for example Col. Abdullahi Yusuf and Gen. Aideed were also fighting the military regime in clan-based organisations, and it was they who finally overthrew it. The concepts of 'Northern' and 'Southern' did not exist at that time.

When forming the transitional institutions, a special dialogue should be established with the Northerners to bring these feelings to light.

- **Creation of a representative National Army**

A National Army must be created by the Transitional Executive, drawn from all parts of Somalia and disregarding all previous ranks. Somalis with military experience can be taken on as trainers and teachers. During the formation of the National Army, the UN Security

Council should guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia.

- **Trials for war-crimes not appropriate at this time**

Trying leaders for war-crimes is not appropriate for Somalia. In a clannish society, there are no war-criminals, because a crime committed by an individual is considered as a crime committed by the whole clan. Though this is one of the worst features of clannism, because innocent people may be punished for a crime committed by a member of their clan, nevertheless at this stage, war-crimes trials would make reconciliation more difficult.

- **Return of property to its rightful owner**

A commission should be set up to restore properties, especially farms and town houses, to their rightful owners. This is particularly important in the case of the unarmed urban Benadiri people who did not take part in the civil wars and yet suffered disproportionately.

Conclusion - Hope in the Horn

Though it will take time to restore the relationships with the neighbouring countries, once a stable administration has been established in Somalia, the conditions should exist for cooperation to gradually develop, as 'Oodi ab ka dhow' or 'Xigto waa degaan' ('Your neighbour is your next of kin').

Looking further ahead, Somalia should work for the Horn of Africa to adopt the spirit and model of the European Union. France and Germany fought three wars in 75 years, but now they live in peace and cooperation, and people cross their borders hardly aware they have passed from one country to another.

In fact, I wonder what other vision there could be for our region, which will secure the future for coming generations, and equip our countries to face the economic, social and environmental challenges which are increasingly super-national in character?

Appendix 1

Detailed description of the formation of representative non-clan-based administrations at District, Regional and National levels.

1. **Reconciliation Conferences in each District** lead to the establishment of representative **District Councils**.
 - i) 15 Facilitators will be recruited for each District to organise the District Reconciliation Conferences (10 Facilitators from the District and 5 from the Diaspora - this will engage the Diaspora, promote collaboration between local and diaspora Somalis, and begin the process of reversing the brain-drain). Each group of Facilitators will undertake a one-week training course together.
 - ii) The Facilitators will be responsible for
 - a) identifying 200 respected members of the community as Delegates to the District Reconciliation Conferences (teachers, engineers, lawyers, business people, traditional elders, women, youth, those who have served in the police and armed forces etc).
 - b) facilitating the District Reconciliation Conferences.
 - iii) The Delegates to the District Reconciliation Conferences which will last 30 days, will elect from their number, 15 persons to form a District Council who will be given a monthly salary.
 - iv) In the capital, Mogadishu, there will be Reconciliation Conferences in each of its 16 Districts.
 - v) This process will be monitored by international observers.
 - vi) The first task of the District Council will be to appoint 3 Police Officers who will recruit and train 150 young people from the District as a police force, of which 100 will operate in the District while the other 50 will assigned to the Regional Police

Force. They will bring their own weapons and will be given rations and a monthly salary.

vii) The District Council will be responsible for assuring security (policing, justice etc), cleanliness, health, education, utilities, services.

2. **Reconciliation Conferences for the District Councils in each Region** lead to the establishment of **Regional Councils**.

i) The Facilitators in a Region will be responsible for gathering the members of the District Councils in that Region for a Regional Reconciliation Conference in the Regional Capital lasting 30 days. By the end of these Conferences, the District Councils will elect from their number a Regional Council of 20 members.

ii) The Regional Council will be responsible for the Regional Police Force and other matters concerning regional coordination, and members will be given a monthly salary.

3. **Establishment of a National Assembly of Elders** with an advisory role.

i) A National Assembly of Elders (NAE) will be formed consisting of the surviving Members of Parliament of the Civilian Governments since 1960-69, of the Military Regime, and of the TNG and TFG; they will be given a monthly salary.

ii) The Members of the NAE will not participate in the Transitional Executive nor the first elected government.

iii) Their task will be to examine proposed laws and recommend amendments.

iv) It is proposed that Abdi-Razaq Haji Hussein, former Prime Minister (1964-7), a man of undisputed integrity, be invited to be the Speaker of the National Assembly of Elders.

- v) Involving these people in the Transitional Period will attract the skilled Somalis and the business community in the Diaspora to support the reconstruction and development.
4. **District Councils elect representatives to a Transitional National Territorial Assembly.**
- i) Each District Council will elect two individuals to a Transitional National Territorial Assembly (TNTA) whose members will be given a monthly salary.
5. **Formation of Transitional Executive**
- i) The two Houses of Parliament, the TNTA and the NAE will elect a President.
 - ii) The President will nominate a Prime Minister.
 - iii) The Prime Ministers will nominate a Cabinet of no more than 20 Ministers.
 - iv) Each Ministry will have a team of 15 experts, 10 locally-recruited and 5 from the Diaspora. Recruitment and selection will be carried out jointly by the International Observers and the Executive. In addition, there should be two or three non-Somali experts to strength the administration of each ministry.
 - v) The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation must have more international experts from the UN to make plans in line with international standards.
 - vi) Ministers and their staff should be adequately remunerated to deter corruption.
6. **Mandate of Transitional Executive**
- Among the responsibilities of the Executive in the course of its Term will be to ensure the drafting of a democratic constitution, the formation of a National Army and of political parties and the conducting of a census.

Appendix 2

A suggested outline salary structure for the proposal above

Notes:

1. The calculations below are based on the assumption of 150 Districts (including 16 in Mogadishu) and 30 Regions (including Mogadishu).
2. The figures are mainly designed to suggest a salary structure that could attract the most suitable candidates. *The totals are notional as the duration of contracts will depend on when the institutions are set up and how soon revenues can be raised by taxation.*
3. The countries which generously granted citizenship to Somalis may be willing to contribute to the peace-making and reconstruction of Somalia.

	No. events/ institu- tions	No. pers.	Sum	Mths	Total US\$ million
Conference Facilitators:					
Locally-recruited (10 per District)		1500	\$1,000	12	\$18
from Diaspora (5 per District)		750	\$2,000	12	\$18
200 Delegates per district) to 150 District Reconciliation Conferences (30 days @ \$50 per day)	150	200	\$1,500	1	\$45
15 District Council Members x 150 District Councils	150	15	\$500	12	\$13.5

	No. events/ institutions	No. pers.	Sum	Mths	Total US\$ million
Delegates (15 per District) to 30 Regional Reconciliation Conferences for 30 days @ \$50 per day	30	75	\$1,500	1	\$3.375
20 Regional Council Members x 30 Regional Councils	20	30	\$500	12	\$3.6
300 Members of National Territorial Assembly		300	\$1,000	12	\$3.6
Members of National Assembly of Elders		500?	\$1000	12	\$6
President			\$3,000	12	\$0.036
Prime Minister			\$2,500	12	\$0.03
Ministers		20	\$2,000	12	\$0.48
Assistant Ministers		20	\$1,500	12	\$0.36
Ministry Staff					
Locally-recruited	20	20	\$500	12	\$2.4
from Diaspora	20	5	\$1,000	12	\$1.2
3 Police officers per District	150	3	\$300	12	\$1.62
150 Police per District	150	150	\$100	12	\$27
Buildings, transport, equipment, communications					\$100
Notional Total for 12 month contracts					\$244.2

Appendix 3

Somali Initiative for Dialogue and Democracy was registered on 12th October 2006 as a UK charity, No. 1116372, with the following objects:

To promote national and international conflict resolution and reconciliation with a view to relieving suffering, poverty and distress, and building and maintaining social cohesion and trust among Somalis and between Somalis and neighbouring communities, in the UK, in other countries hosting Somali refugees, and in Somalia, observing strict neutrality, without regard for clan or political allegiance, by means of the following activities:

- *investigating and identifying probable causes of the conflict*
- *examining possible solutions to the conflict through participatory research into relevant economic and social issues*
- *publishing reports for the public benefit on the causes of the conflict and recommended solutions*
- *mediating with parties to the conflict through facilitated dialogues and larger reconciliation meetings to increase mutual understanding and awareness and build trust*
- *providing courses to train Somali-language facilitators to organise dialogues in the UK and in Somalia*
- *providing courses and using other means to increase understanding of the importance of moral and spiritual values in private and public life as a basis for the development of democracy*
- *producing and distributing resource materials, including printed (books, pamphlets, reports of activities etc), visual (film) to create an environment favourable to reconciliation*
- *working in partnership with other agencies with similar objectives.*

Appendix 4

Human Security concerns every one of us on earth – not just those in war zones, the poor or threatened.

Speech by Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, President of Initiatives of Change International and International Patron of Somali Initiative for Dialogue and Democracy at international conference 'Addressing the Root Causes of Human Insecurity', Caux, Switzerland, August 2008.

We all feel insecure as human beings, and naturally so. We experience all kinds of traumas as we grow, but there are also the inherited traumas, genetic, biological and psychological. We learn to deal with these traumas through education and learning.

But then situations and stresses occur which reawaken these insecurities – economic, sociological and environmental threats, dangers confronting ourselves or our families and those close to us, our communities, our whole societies. Human security is about finding the capacity to deal with these stresses. It means equipping ourselves and others with the ability and tools that enable individuals and communities to survive dangerous threats.

This summer in Caux we have investigated causes, the reasons that people feel insecure. In 2009, we need to work more on remedies and responses. What should we be aiming at in terms of response? I see five strategic aims:

1. **We must tackle the question of governance.** In history, we have seen improvements in governance, towards more democracy. But today, perhaps two thirds of humanity lives beyond the rule of law. That creates tremendous stress. So how can we improve that? A better government of ourselves, of countries and of the international system. Many are calling for this, but we're still too far behind. We must build up states' capacity to deal with the problems of their citizens through the rule of law and by drastically

reducing corruption. People will only feel secure if their environment is managed by people who are honest.

2. **A Global ‘Marshall Plan’¹ to target the countries that have improved their governance** so that they can catch up after centuries of under-development. Too many think only in terms of military security, when a major threat is the lack of any economic hope in many countries. We need to raise all humanity to survival level. The failure of the Doha Round of talks at the World Trade Organisation is a sad step backwards. The vision of a new Marshall Plan could appeal to the generosity of the developed countries.
3. **The dialogue between cultures.** There are serious issues here, with are exploited by some – this is so short-sighted. There must be progress in the dialogue between cultures and religions. It’s an urgent priority today. We must make a tremendous effort to help people to accept diversity and difference, and to live in harmony. We need to work enough on the first two aims, - then this other dialogue becomes easier, people are readier to accept the other. Local conflicts are often given a global colouring, thanks to global communications. This feeds and complicates local conflicts.
4. **Dealing with wounded memories** – this is absolutely essential. Often in normal education and the teaching of history these wounds are not forgotten or healed, but passed on from generation to generation. Dialogue, research and an engaged discussion are needed to understand better the injustices of history. We need to search our memories – this could help a lot.
5. **The responsibility to protect and to prevent.** How can we be alert enough to prevent conflicts, to see the first warning signals of tensions and work for prevention? As with health care, vaccinations and x-rays for early diagnosis, to see the warning signals of danger. The degradation of the environment is very

¹ American plan after the Second World War to assist the recovery of Europe.

important here: islands are vanishing, populations are being forced to move. We need a prevention process.

Why Caux? Can Caux make a difference? It is not a meeting place for arguing with each other or for negotiations. We try to come with an open mind, to listen, and to search together for solutions. In most meetings there are so many conflicts of interests at work. But it is important to be able to bring in people from this world of negotiations. We need to learn to see the long term. We are all in the same boat, though some are travelling First Class, and others in steerage. If the boat sinks, we all sink. The environmental issues help us to understand this.